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Abstract
Arab political regimes are both unusually undemocratic and unusually stable. A series of statistical models are nested to parse 
competing explanations. The democratic deficit is comprehensible in terms of modernization, British colonial history, neigh-
borhood effects, reliance on taxes, ethnic homogeneity, and the Arab population share, with the last determinant subject to 
multiple interpretations. Hypotheses that did not receive robust support include the presence of oil rents, conflict with Israel 
or other neighbors, or the influence of Islam. The odds on liberalizing transitions occurring are low but rising, and alternative 
interpretations of the Arab population share variable are important in this regard.
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Long-lived undemocratic political regimes are relatively ubiquitous in the Arab world. According to the 
Polity IV Project scoring, no other developing or predominately non-OECD region experienced fewer 
regime changes on average for the period 1960–2000 than did the Arab Middle East (figure 1). On 
average, these countries experienced 1.4 regime changes so defined during this period. Algeria and Syria 
were the least stable countries, with three regime changes each, while Egypt, Iraq, Kuwait, Libya, Oman, 
Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates experienced no regime changes during this period. 
Not only are these regimes enduring, as a group, they are highly undemocratic (figure 2). In 2000 
all received negative assessments on the polity ratings that range from 10 (most democratic) to –10 (least 
democratic), based inter alia on the relative competitiveness of executive recruitment, constraints on the 
chief executive, and competitiveness of political participation. Individual country scores ranged from 
–2 in the cases of Jordan and Yemen, to –10, the absolute minimum, in the cases of Qatar and Saudi 
Arabia. There is modest evidence of liberalization in the data—five countries exhibit notable increases in 
democratization scores over the sample period, two exhibit declines, and the scores for the remainder are 
unchanged or exhibit fluctuations without any obvious trend.4 This combination of authoritarianism and 
stability is indeed unique. 
There is a large academic literature examining the region’s democratic deficit from a variety of 
epistemological perspectives. Yet large n statistical analyses of the determinants of democracy sometimes 
dismiss the Arab experience as sui generis (e.g., Przeworski et al. 2000), while regionally oriented research 
tends to focus on particular explanations in relative isolation, such as the role of oil and/or rents (e.g., 
Ross 2001, Herb 2005) or the impact of Islam (e.g., Fish 2002). The latter approach, while informative, 
cannot be definitive because it cannot adequately weigh competing explanations. This is a real problem 
for this literature because if two sets of explanatory variables are correlated (for example, the presence 
of oil and the Muslim population share), then regressions that include one and exclude the other will 
  For the purposes of this paper the Arab Middle East is defined as Algeria, Bahrain, Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Lib-
ya, Morocco, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Tunisia, the United Arab Emirates, and Yemen. Operationally, a number of the 
countries are effectively excluded from the subsequent regression analysis due to extensive missing data. This definition excludes 
some non-Arab states that are sometimes included in the Middle East North Africa (MENA) region, particularly Iran, Israel, and 
Turkey. These three, while not part of the Arab world, are included in the overall sample used in the statistical analyses reported 
in appendix table A.
  “Regime change” is defined in the Polity IV dataset as a minimum three-point change in the polity score (in either direction), 
denoting “a substantive, normative change in political authority considered sufficient to present greater opportunities for regime 
opponents to challenge the noninstitutionalized authority of the polity”(Marshall and Jaggers 2004, 27). It goes without saying 
that this definition of regime change” is considerably more modest than that used in popular parlance. See Przeworski et al. 
(2000, chapter 1) for discussion. 
  For the record, in addition to Qatar and Saudi Arabia, seven other countries scored –10 at some point between 1960 and 
2000: Bahrain, Haiti, Iran, Jordan, Kuwait, Oman, and Swaziland. Qatar and Saudi Arabia alone scored –10 for the entire sample 
period.  
4  Using Freedom House data, Bellin (2004, table 1) finds little evidence of systematic trends (though Lakoff 2004 argues that 
there is a trend—and that it is in the undemocratic direction). Herb (2005) argues that the Freedom House measures are superior 
to the Polity IV scores used here. Przeworski et al. (2000) and others argue that there are no systematic differences in results 
obtained on the basis of the two datasets. Page 3
erroneously attribute the statistical influence of the omitted variables to the included variables, rendering 
the statistical inferences derived from them invalid. The only way to parse these competing explanations 
is to specify a general model and test the nested hypotheses. 
In this paper a large number of hypotheses are nested within a series of cross-country statistical 
models. Methodologically these models are very good at discriminating among hypotheses relating to 
underlying structural prerequisites for democracy or factors associated with political liberalization. Caveat 
emptor: they are not very useful for examining hypotheses involving “democratization as a contingent 
choice of regime and opposition actors that can occur in a variety of socioeconomic and cultural 
conditions” (Posusney 2004, 128). 
DETERMINANTS OF DEMOCRACY
There is a large body of literature on the determinants of democracy and a number of relatively 
uncontroversial hypotheses—such as the importance of national identity and “modernization,” as 
manifested in economic and/or educational attainment—as precursors for the establishment of stable, 
democratic polities going back to Lipset (1959) and Rustow (1970). Subsequent arguments about 
democratic waves (Huntington 1984, 1993) or regional spillover “neighborhood” effects (Solingen 1998, 
Gleditsch 2002) have generally been substantiated empirically, and one could think of these as forming 
the core of a statistical model of democratic attainment across countries and over time. Beyond these 
relatively uncontroversial notions there are a much larger group of contested hypotheses. After this 
“core” model is estimated, “structural” hypotheses involving historical origins, external relations, and the 
structure of the economy are examined, followed by “internal” or cultural explanations. The hypotheses 
receiving statistical support are then synthesized and their quantitative relevance assessed.
Structural Hypotheses
Operationally a model of Polity IV scores was specified as a function of national identity proxied by 
ethnic fractionalization (its inverse); “modernization” represented by log real per capita income, log 
literacy, and log urbanization; the average world level of democracy; and the average level of democracy 
of bordering countries (the neighborhood variable). Each indicator is lagged by one year and reported 
in the first column of table 1.5 The sample is 85 countries listed in appendix table A.1, accounting for 
5  A list of other variables tried, but in the interests of brevity not necessarily reported in the results, includes GDP per capita, a 
dummy for OECD membership, literacy rate, educational attainment measured in terms of years of schooling, life expectancy, 
telephones and televisions per 1,000 people, college enrollment, population density, urbanization, growth rate of the urban 
population, international trade openness, a tropical climate dummy, latitude, area, agricultural employment as a share of the 
labor force, the literacy gender gap, the sex ratio, ethnolinguistic fractionalization, neighborhood and world polity scores, general 
conflict and Israel conflict dummies, colonial history dummies, legal origin dummies, legal transplant dummies, Hofstede and 
McClelland cultural indicators, religious affiliation and Arab ethnic population shares, Muslim and Arab population majority 
dummies, regional dummies including an Arabian peninsula dummy, tax revenue as a share of government revenue, government Page 4
roughly 80 percent of world population and 90 percent of world output for the period 1970–2000. 
In the subsequent analysis it was found that the three modernization proxies were highly collinear. In 
response, a principal components aggregate (PCA, labeled “modernization”) was formed, with nearly 
identical weights on the three components (GDP per capita 0.34; literacy 0.33; urbanization 0.33). 
The regression is estimated using a random-effects estimator that controls for individual time-
series and cross-sectional error components in the panel (Hsiao 1986). As might be expected, the level 
of democracy in a particular country is strongly correlated with its ethnic homogeneity, its level of 
modernization, and the levels of democracy in the world and among its immediate neighbors. 
A second common set of explanations about democratic performance involves the historical 
origins of a country’s political institutions. Lipset et al. (1993), for example, has argued that democracy is 
associated with British colonial rule, though the empirical support for this proposition is mixed (cf. Barro 
1999, Przeworski et al. 2000, Fish 2002).7 In regression 1.2, dummy variables for colonial rule are added 
to the specification.8 The coefficient on the British colonial dummy is positive and significant, indicating 
that British colonial origins are indeed associated with democracy. 
consumption, rents as a share of government revenue, grants as a share of government revenue, aid as a share of government 
revenue, a fuel exporter dummy, fuel exports as a share of GDP, an OPEC membership dummy, military expenditure as a share 
of GDP, and military personnel as a share of the labor force. An appendix with variable definitions and data sources is available 
from the author upon request.
  A number of previous studies have used larger cross-sectional samples. Our sample is constrained by data availability in light 
of the large number of explanatory variables that will be used in the subsequent analysis. We do not regard this as particularly 
problematic—the omitted countries are typically either very small, very poor, or both, and the quality of data in some of these 
cases is highly questionable. Given the quality of the underlying data, we do not believe that maximizing sample size by using 
extrapolations and other ad hoc methods to fill in missing observations per Herb (2005) is warranted. Roughly 85 countries ac-
counting for 80 percent of the world’s population ought to be a large enough sample from which to draw statistical inferences. 
In one concession to this sample issue, literacy is used as a measure of human capital rather than alternative measures of educa-
tional attainment because the literacy data are more widely available than schooling data needed to calculate other indicators. 
7  However, it should be noted that both Barro and Fish, who do not obtain any positive impact of British colonialism, estimate 
regressions with lagged dependent variables that are estimated with coefficients of approximately 1.0—in effect they are estimat-
ing regressions on democratic change or democratization, not the level of democracy. This issue is addressed directly in the 
succeeding section. 
8  Some previous researchers included other regional specific dummy variables, such as a Middle East North Africa (MENA) 
dummy or an Arabian peninsular dummy. The regional dummies are significant if included in regressions 2.1 or 2.2 but fall out 
later in the analysis when underlying structural factors are taken into account. Ross (2001) also includes a dummy for OECD 
membership. However, it is not clear that this dummy is truly exogenous—given the origins of the OECD, it is arguable that 
democracy, or at least a certain degree of political openness, was an implicit prerequisite for admission.
  Acemoglu, Robinson, and Johnson (2001) argue that the degree of success in transferring metropole institutions to colonies 
was essentially a political investment decision driven by the presence of colonial settler populations that were significantly con-
strained in some locales by tropical diseases and other environmental influences. Unfortunately, their instrument for institutional 
development, settler death rates, is available for only a limited number of countries, and more easily available, though crude prox-
ies, such as tropical climate or latitude, were not significant in this application. Other characteristics distinguishing the historical 
origins of contemporary polities, such as origins of their legal systems, were generally insignificant once colonial origins were 
taken into account.Page 5
It has been frequently argued that the existence of large rents that can be captured by the state 
impedes democracy. In the Middle East, oil production is the dominant, though not exclusive, source 
of such rents.0 Multiple channels for antidemocratic effects of rents have been identified. First, the 
existence of rents may absolve governments from taxation and, as a consequence, relieve pressure for 
accountability through what might be called the “accountability effect” (Ross 2001). A straightforward 
indicator would be the tax share of government revenue. Second, rents may furnish governments 
with revenues for patronage and again relieve discontent or undercut the formation of social groups 
independent of the state. Government consumption as a share of national income could be a rough 
proxy for this. A third channel for rents to impede democracy would be by financially enabling the 
development and maintenance of institutions of internal repression.
Table 2 reports six rent-related regressions. In regression 2.1, tax revenue as a share of 
government revenue is added to the basic model. Its coefficient is significant and positive as expected—
democracy is associated with a higher tax component of state revenue. In regression 2.2, government 
consumption as a share of GDP is added to the basic model, and its coefficient is positive and statistically 
insignificant. If the “patronage effect” hypothesis were correct, one would expect this coefficient to 
be negative. This result points to a more general concern with these regressions: While colonial origins 
are exogenous, and any causal relationship, if it exists, runs from colonial origins to current politics, the 
direction of causality is less clear with respect to government spending. It could be that democracies have 
large public sectors because the masses support government spending as a mechanism for redistributing 
income. This is less of an issue in regression 2.1 since it is the tax share of revenues, not the overall level 
of taxation or revenues, which is the explanatory variable. 
The next three columns of table 2 report specifications using alternative measures of rent. In 
regression 2.3, following Birdsall and Subramanian (2004), a dummy variable for countries in which 
fuel exports account for more than 0 percent of export revenues is added to the basic model and 
estimated with the expected negative coefficient. In regression 2.5, a broader measure of rents (defined 
as entrepreneurial and property income) as a share of government revenue are added to the core 
specification and estimated with the expected negative sign. In the final column, aid (another source 
0  For general descriptions of the rentier state phenomenon, see Beblawi (1990), Luciani (1990, 1995), Anderson (2001), and 
Lust-Okar (2004). 
  As Anderson (2001, 56) observes, “the public sector accounts for over half the labor force: government employment is a 
form of social security” in the region.
  Ross (2001) argues that this approach mistakenly implies that the adverse effect of oil rents only takes effect beyond a certain 
threshold and that a continuous variable is preferred. In regression 2.4, fuel and mineral revenues as a share of total export 
revenues is added to the regression per Ross. The coefficient is statistically insignificant, and for the remainder of the paper the 
Birdsall-Subramanian formulation is used.
  Some analysts (e.g., Herb 2005) argue that this is a disadvantage insofar as included state-owned enterprise income is not re-
ally rent and excluded oil taxes really are. If what one is concerned about, per Anderson (2001), is the state’s capacity to channel 
patronage, however, then the broader measure that includes state-owned enterprises is really to be preferred.Page 
of rent) was added to the specification and estimated with a positive coefficient. If the rents impede 
democracy, then one would expect this coefficient to be negative. However, it could be the case that the 
causality runs the other direction—a higher level of democracy induces more assistance, such as in the 
case of the Millennium Challenge Account (which admittedly did not exist during this sample period). 
Then the coefficient would be positive as obtained—and the aid variable would not be an exogenous 
regressor. 
The third way rents affect democracy is through the “repression effect.”14 Ideally one would 
want data on internal security services, though in reality the distinction between the internal and external 
security services may be more theoretical than real. And the region is highly militarized: Arab states 
accounted for 9 of the top 20 countries ranked either by military expenditures as a share of GDP or 
soldiers per 1,000 persons (US Department of State 2002). The first two columns of table 3 add military 
expenditure as a share of national income and military personnel as a share of the labor force. The 
coefficient on the military expenditure is insignificant, but the coefficient on the population share under 
arms is negative—greater militarization is associated with less democracy, though again, the direction of 
causality is debatable. 
A related explanation might be called the “wag the dog” hypothesis—governments use internal 
and external conflict to enable undemocratic rule.15 This argument is most often made with respect to the 
Arab-Israeli conflict, but one could think of it in more general terms, encompassing other conflicts, such 
as Morocco’s fight with the Polisario or Libya’s incursions into Chad. In regression 3.3, a general conflict 
dummy variable is added, set equal to unity if a country was involved in an internal or external conflict 
resulting in 1,000 or more battlefield deaths in that year. It is estimated with the expected negative 
coefficient. In regression 3.4, an Israel conflict dummy was added, set equal to unity for Egypt, Jordan, 
and Syria from 1967 until they normalized relations with Israel. This coefficient is insignificant, though 
almost three times larger than the general conflict coefficient.17
14  Bellin (2004, 143), for example, writes, “The will and capacity of the state’s coercive apparatus to suppress democratic initia-
tive have extinguished the possibility of transition. Herein lies the region’s true exceptionalism.”
15  Cause (1995, 286) is typical: “Wars tend to concentrate power in the hands of the executive, a power most leaders are loath to 
give up. Wars make it easier to stigmatize as treasonous, and then suppress, opposition forces. War preparation leads to greater 
state control over the economy, limiting the power and autonomy of private sector economic actors who might press for demo-
cratic reform. War preparation requires building coercive apparatus that then can be used internally. . . .” Bellin writes, “Besides 
providing rhetorical legitimization for coercive regimes, persistent conflict has rationalized the prolonged states of emergency 
that stifle civil liberties in many MENA countries” (p. 157). With respect to the Arab-Israeli conflict, Anderson (2001, 56) 
observes: “It may be no coincidence that the prospects for democracy seem to increase in direct proportion to the distance of a 
country from the Arab-Israeli and Persian Gulf arenas.”  
  Cause (1995, 287) observes “the tentative opening of the Egyptian political system in the late 1970s occurred after Egypt had 
opted out of the Arab-Israeli conflict” (emphasis in the original).
17   However, this is the only case in which disaggregating the PCA makes a qualitative difference. If per capita income, literacy, 
and urbanization are entered separately, then the Israel conflict variable is statistically significant with a coefficient more than 
three times the size of the general conflict coefficient.Page 
CULTURAL EXPLANATIONS
The hypotheses examined thus far might be regarded as being “structural” in nature. Another class of 
explanations might be thought of as internal to society or cultural in nature. Huntington (1984), for 
example, argued that the prevalence of certain values and beliefs made some societies more compatible 
with democracies than others, citing McClelland’s (1961) attempt to measure the “need to achieve” based 
on an analysis of third- and fourth-grade school readers for a sample of countries in 1950. Perhaps  
a sample significantly limited by data availability.
Huntington (1996) subsequently argued that the cultural origins of the democratic West lay in its 
globally distinct emphasis on individualism, invoking the work of Hofstede (1983, 2001).18 Indeed, one 
of Hofstede’s variables is statistically correlated with democracy, though not the one that Huntington 
identified. As shown in regression 4.2, it is power-distance, the measure of comfort with hierarchy, 
which is negatively correlated with democracy, not the degree of cultural individualism as measured 
in Hofstede’s scores. In regression 4.3, the need to achieve and power-distance culture measures are 
entered jointly and both retain their statistical significance, though strangely the world democracy average 
(representing the “democratic wave” effect) turns negative in this truncated sample.
More controversial as a determinant of democracy is the general role of religion and the specific 
role of Islam. Huntington (1984, 1996), for example, argues that specific religious or cultural traditions 
are good or bad for democracy.0 Islam, he argues, is bad, a view supported in the writings of scholars 
such as Kedourie (1992, 1)—“Democracy is alien to the mind-set of Islam”—and Voight (2005)—and 
the statistical analyses of Barro (1999) and Fish (2002, 4), who argues that his analysis provides “strong 
support for the hypothesis that Muslim countries are democratic underachievers.” 
18  According to Hofstede, statistical analysis of the responses to two rounds of survey questionnaires administered to 88,000 
IBM employees over 1967–73 suggested that they could be characterized along four dimensions: a power-distance index (“the 
extent to which the less powerful members of institutions and organizations within a country expect and accept that power 
is unequally distributed”); an uncertainty-avoidance index (“the extent to which the members of a culture feel threatened by 
uncertain or unknown situations”); an individualism-collectivism dimension (“individualism stands for a society in which the ties 
between individuals are loose. . . collectivism stands for a society in which people from birth onwards are integrated into strong, 
cohesive in-groups. . . .”); and a masculine-feminine dimension (“masculinity stands for a society in which social gender roles are 
clearly distinct . . . femininity stands for a society in which social gender roles overlap: both men and women are supposed to be 
modest, tender, and concerned with the quality of life”). It is fair to say that this research is controversial. See McSweeney (2002) 
for a critique.
  Ironically, in earlier an work Huntington identified comfort with hierarchy as an antidemocratic cultural attribute: “A politi-
cal culture that highly values hierarchical relationships and extreme deference to authority presumably is less fertile ground for 
democracy than one that does not” (Huntington 1984, 209). 
0  For example, he writes, “Confucianism and Buddhism have been conductive to authoritarian rule…Islam has not been hospi-
table to democracy….The one Islamic country that sustained even intermittent democracy after World War II was Turkey, which 
had, under Mustafa Kemal, explicitly rejected its Islamic tradition and defined itself as a secular republic. The one Arab country 
that sustained democracy, albeit of a consociational variety, for any time was Lebanon, 40 to 50 percent of whose population was 
Christian and whose democratic institutions collapsed when the Moslem majority asserted itself in the 1970s” (Huntington 1984 
p.208).Page 8
The statistical evidence on this point is ambiguous, turning on the definition of the comparator 
group. In the first column of table 5, the population shares ascribing to major world religions are 
added to the core model. The coefficients on the Hindu, Buddhist, Jewish, and Protestant Christian 
population shares are all positive and significant. The coefficient on the Muslim share is insignificant. 
However, these coefficients are all significantly greater or less than zero relative to the omitted group. 
If the definition of the omitted group changes, then so will the estimated coefficients. In regression 
5.2, only the Muslim population share is included and is estimated with a statistically significant negative 
coefficient—i.e. if Muslims are compared to all non-Muslims (regression 5.2), then they appear distinct. 
However, if Muslims are compared with a group consisting of agnostics, atheists, animists, Confucians, 
Shintoists, Bahais, Rastafarians et al., then they are not.
Islam, like other religions, is open-ended, subject to interpretation, and widely varying in practice 
across both the dimensions of time and distance. The topic of this paper is Arab political regimes, and 
the category “Muslim” may be too broad to be analytically meaningful (cf. Zubaida 1995). Specifically, in 
non-Arab Muslim societies, pre-Islamic local traditions or the influences of non-Muslim groups, such as 
the Chinese in Southeast Asia or the French in West Africa, may attenuate the impact of Middle Eastern 
traditions. To investigate this possibility, the Muslim population share of each country was weighted by 
dividing by the distance between the national capital and Mecca (i.e., the weighted Muslim share declines 
with distance) and is reported in regression 5.4. The greater statistical significance of the estimated 
coefficient of the distance-weighted Muslim population share in comparison to the unweighted Muslim 
population share suggests that there may be something to this notion.
To push this further and explore whether the influence of Islam is being conflated with Arab 
culture, the ethnic Arab population share was added to the model (regression 5.5) and is estimated with 
a negative coefficient almost twice as large as the Muslim population share coefficient in regression 5.2. 
In regression 5.6, the two variables are entered jointly, and the Muslim population share variable loses its 
statistical significance—it would appear that the category “Arab,” not “Muslim,” is driving these results. 
Zogby’s finding that the Arab ethnicity is the primary self-identification category in most Arab countries 
lends some plausibility to this conclusion.24 
  Huntington (1996, 70) observes that among non-Western societies only Hindu civilization shared the West’s distinct separa-
tion of religion and politics that “contributed immeasurably to the development of freedom in the West.” He did not speculate 
as to whether the same cultural attribute might not have the same political impact in a non-Western society. 
  Fish (2002) argues that what is important is not the Muslim share, but whether Muslims are a majority. In regression 5.3, 
the Muslim share is replaced with a Muslim majority dummy. The results are virtually identical, and the choice between the two 
makes no difference in the subsequent analysis, so the Muslim share specification is retained.
  The regressions were also estimated with an Arab majority dummy replacing the Arab ethnic share variable. This distinction 
had no appreciable impact on the results.
24  This result would also be consistent with the argument of Stepan and Robertson (2004) that the Arab countries display in-
creasing political distinctiveness within the broader Muslim community. Among the 19 Muslim-majority former British colonies, 
the 8 non-Arab countries all joined the Commonwealth, while none of the 9 Arab countries did. This is particularly intriguing in 
light of former British colonial status being among the most robust correlates with democracy. With respect to more recent be-Page 9
Many Muslims and many Arabs live in oil-exporting countries, and it is important to model the 
potential relationships among these variables carefully; otherwise one runs the risk of misattributing the 
influence of one variable to the other.25 In the final three columns of table 5, the oil exporter variable 
is entered in combination with the Muslim and Arab population share variables. When the Muslim 
population share and oil exporter variables are entered jointly (regression 5.7), both are significant. When 
the Arab population share is entered jointly with the oil exporter dummy, the coefficient on the oil 
exporter variable becomes insignificant (regression 5.8). When all three are entered together (regression 
5.9), only the coefficient on the Arab ethnic share is statistically significant. 
 The message emerging from table 5 is that it is Arab ethnicity, not adherence to Islam or the 
exportation of oil that matters. However, this is simply a statistical relationship—it does not indicate what 
the channel for this effect is. Some scholars, such as Sharabi (1988), have argued that elements of Arab 
culture are authoritarian, which would lend an essentialist causal interpretation to this result. 
Alternatively, Stepan and Robertson (2004) argue that for whatever reason, Arab elites have 
chosen an increasingly distinct and undemocratic political path. This view would seem to be contradicted, 
however, by polling data in which Arabs list “civil rights” as their primary political concern (Zogby 
2002) and data from the World Values Survey and other sources indicate that large majorities of Arabs 
are supportive of democracy (Tessler and Gao 2005). It could be that the interests of the governing 
elites and the man on the street diverge, and that the Arab population share is acting as a proxy for an 
omitted variable, such as expenditures on internal security services, which reflect particular historical 
circumstances and political choices and are not intrinsic characteristics of Arab culture per se. This could 
possibly be related to the relatively common occurrence of governments based at least partly on 
narrow subethnic or tribal allegiances. Or it could also be the case that in a deep sense this result is in 
a statistical sense correct, and really a historical artifact: It is correctly capturing a particular historical 
moment in a geographically defined region, but that moment is itself transitory, and the identifier Arab 
has little long-run explanatory power. 
Fish (2002) makes the intriguing argument that the negative influence of Islam on democracy 
is due to the subjugation of women, which he implies is an innate aspect of Islam, citing Mernissi 
(1987), Sharabi (1988), the UN Development Program’s Arab Human Development Report (2002), and other 
sources. And indeed, historically, the status of Arab women has been unenviable, though over the sample 
period considered here (1970–2000), gains in female educational attainment and health status have been 
impressive (World Bank 2004). Yet the two notions are separable: The link between democracy and the
havior, Stepan and Robertson document the very different behavior of the Arab and non-Arab Muslim-majority countries with 
respect to the use of international technical assistance in holding elections and foreign election monitors.
25  For example, Fish (2002, tables 2 through 5), after appearing to establish that OPEC membership is a robust negative corre-
late with democracy, inexplicably drops the OPEC variable when analyzing the influence Islam and the status of women have on 
democracy (Fish 2002, table 10). This is practically a textbook example of probable omitted variable bias.
  Unfortunately, the ethnolinguistic data does report identity at a sufficiently fine level of disaggregation to test this rigorously.Page 10
 status of women may hold whether it is related to Islam or not. One can accept one part of the 
argument without necessarily buying into the other.
Fish uses four indicators to measure the status of women: the difference in male and female 
literacy rates, the sex ratio (the number of males per 100 females), the percentage of high-ranking 
positions in executive branch agencies occupied by women, and finally a composite gender empowerment 
index constructed by the UN Development Program. Unfortunately, time-series data permitting the 
construction of a reasonable panel are only available for the first two measures. Another possible 
indicator of the status of women would be the female share of the labor force. One could imagine that 
this would signal the economic status of women and, by extension, their ability to place demands on the 
political system. 
In regressions 6.1, 6.2, and 6.3 (table 6), the literacy gap, sex ratio, and female labor participation 
variables are added to a specification of the core model augmented by the Muslim share, Arab share, 
and fuel exporter variables. The literacy gap is estimated with a positive and statistically significant 
coefficient. However, this estimate is fragile, and is strongly influenced by the inclusion of four South 
Asian countries—India, Nepal, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka—all of which combine high literacy gaps with at 
least some periods of high democratic polity scores during the sample period.27 In regression 6.2, the sex 
ratio is estimated with the expected negative coefficient, and in regression 6.3, the coefficient on female 
labor force share is statistically insignificant. Taken together these results do not strongly support the 
hypothesis linking democracy to the status of women. Yet even if one focuses on regression 6.2, with 
regard to Fish’s argument about Islam and the status of women, the significance of the sex ratio and 
the insignificance of the Muslim population share could be interpreted two ways. One possibility would 
be to argue that if Islam impedes democracy through the subjugation of women, it is the only channel 
through which it does so—Islam has no explanatory power beyond this. Alternatively one could interpret 
this result as indicating that the devaluation of women (for whatever reason) is negatively associated 
with democracy, and Islam is irrelevant in this regard. At the same time, the significant coefficient on the 
Arab population share variable reinforces the impression that previous analysis may have conflated the 
influence of Islam with something more properly attributed to Arab political cultures.
ASSESSMENT
These six tables suggest a rich and complex set of possible determinants of democracy. Table 7 reports 
a set of regressions derived from the preceding analysis. Modernization, ethnolinguistic fractionalization, 
the average neighborhood polity score, the average world polity score, the Arab ethnicity population 
share, British colonial history, and the share of taxes in state revenues are robust correlates with 
democracy. Conditional on these variables, the Muslim population share, the oil exporter dummy, the 
27  If two South Asia countries are excluded from the sample, the coefficient on the literacy gap usually becomes insignificant; if 
all four South Asian countries are excluded, the estimated coefficient reverses signs, though this estimated coefficient is statisti-
cally insignificant.Page 11
military personnel population share, the general conflict dummy, and the Israel conflict dummy are not 
correlated with democracy. The sex ratio is marginally significant in regression 7.7.28 These regressions 
explain more than half of the total sample variation (R [overall]) and roughly two-thirds of cross-
sectional variation (R [between]) when the temporal variation in the data is suppressed.
In table 8, the coefficients from regression 7.7 are used to calculate the impact on the democracy 
scores of a one standard deviation change in each of the explanatory variables. The biggest single 
impact is of British colonial history—a positive value of this dummy variable is worth more than three 
points, which in the Polity IV definition would amount to a regime change if a change of this magnitude 
occurred in three years or less. The next three largest effects come from modernization, regional 
spillover effects, and the Arab ethnic share. The neighborhood effect is much more important than the 
impact of worldwide democracy waves—the influence of a one standard deviation change in the regional 
average has four times the impact of a similar magnitude change in the worldwide average. The effect 
of modernization and ethnic fragmentation is larger than the effect of rents as represented by the tax 
revenue share variable. Table  reports the actual and predicted country democracy scores derived from 
regression 7.1 for the terminal year of 2000. In only two cases, Morocco (–2.1) and Jordan (2.0), do the 




To model the likelihood of liberalizing transitions, the Polity IV definition of regime change is redefined 
as a three-point or more positive (though not necessarily irreversible) change in the score over a period 
of three years or less. Examples of such liberalizing episodes in the sample would include Spain’s 
transition from the Franco regime to parliamentary democracy in 1975, the 1985 end of military rule in 
Brazil, South Korea’s transition to civilian government in 1987, the 1989–90 collapse of the Ceauşescu 
regime and the beginning of democracy in Romania, and South Africa’s post-apartheid transition, during 
1992–94. In the Arab world, examples would include political reforms initiated in Tunisia in 1987 and 
28  The power distance variable is also marginally significant in a smaller, data-constrained sample.
  In other contexts, some have argued that the British colonial effect is derived from the inclusion of small Caribbean island 
democracies. This argument is not applicable in the current setting—those small island democracies are not in the sample. 
0  In the case of Morocco, its apparent democratic underachievement is driven by the neighborhood effect—because of the 
Spanish enclaves of Ceuta and Melilla, Morocco technically borders Spain, which is used in the calculation of Morocco’s neigh-
borhood effect. If these Spanish enclaves were excised, as some Moroccans might wish, then the value of Morocco’s neighbor-
hood variable, and consequently its fitted democracy score, would fall, in fact bringing Morocco almost precisely to the regres-
sion line. Jordan is a relative democratic overachiever. It has a smaller non-Arab minority than the other countries in table 9, and 
as a consequence predicted negative impact of Arab ethnicity is relatively large, which pulls down the predicted democracy score.
  See Carothers (2002) for a thoughtful critique of the assumptions underlying the democratic transition literature. For expo-
sitional convenience, “liberalizing” and “democratizing” will be used interchangeably in this paper, keeping in mind Carothers’s 
admonition that the two are not identical. 
  In Tunisia, president-for-life Habib Bourguiba was declared medically unfit and, following the relevant provisions of the Page 12
in Algeria and Jordan in 1989.34 Per Carothers, the relatively tentative (and possibly reversible) process 
of liberalization in the Arab countries may be more typical of the worldwide experience in political 
development over the past generation than the more well-known and decisive breakthroughs cited 
previously.
One way of thinking about the apparent stability of the region’s authoritarian political regimes is 
to ask, what is the probability of a liberalizing transition at any given point of time? In this formulation, 
the unit of analysis is the national polity, the subject of analysis is a binary variable of whether or not 
this polity experienced political change in this period, and the subject of investigation are the forces 
that would give rise to political change. In statistical terms such an approach is known as a proportional 
hazard (PH) or duration model; operationally one would construct a panel dataset defined by a set of 
i countries for t years. This approach facilitates modeling a rich set of regime dynamics: for example, 
allowing the probability of the hazard (political change) occurring at a particular time to depend on the 
number or recentness of prior hazards.35 The estimated coefficients represent the impact of a covariate 
on the “hazard of failure.” 
The next task is to identify the set of variables to be used as explanators of liberalizing regime 
changes. There is a large body of work on theories of political change and its determinants. Some of 
these theories are more amenable to modeling than others (in particular, theories that focus on country or 
regime characteristics as opposed to those that emphasize a country’s relation to the world system), and 
even among explanations centering on internal characteristics, there are issues of data availability, at least 
at the cross-national level.37 
constitution, replaced by the then recently appointed prime minister general, Zine El-Abidine Ben Ali, who initiated widespread 
political and economic reforms, including legalizing previously banned political parties, releasing roughly 100 Islamist political 
prisoners, and pardoning more than 8,000 detainees. However, in the words of one observer, “By the early 1990s, Ben Ali was 
practicing the full Bourguiba, cult and all” (Henry 2004, 12). The Constitution was revised to excise the office of president-for-
life, but this did not prevent Ben Ali from being reelected for the third time in 1999 with 100 percent of the vote and in 2002 
pushing through a constitutional amendment permitting an unlimited number of consecutive terms in office. In October 2004 
he was reelected with 94 percent of the vote.
  The constitutional changes in Algeria, which involved a reduction in the dominance of the National Liberation Front and the 
introduction of multiparty elections, were subsequently reversed. Another move toward more representative government began 
in 1995, following a period marked by extraconstitutional government and widespread political violence. In recent years there has 
been continued political liberalization, though the armed forces maintain a dominant role in politics.
34  In Jordan, the period 1989–92 witnessed the lifting of martial law restrictions on political activity, the integration of previ-
ously excluded groups into the political process, and the first national elections in 22 years, in the context of monarchical rule.
35  For informative introductions to these (and related) models, see Box-Steffensmeier and Jones (1997), Bennett (1999), van den 
Berg (2000), and Box-Steffensmeier and Zorn (2001). See Gasiorowski (1995) for an application to political regime stability. 
  In this application all of the models have been estimated in the form of Weibull functions, which impose monotonicity on the 
relationship between the regime variable and the right-hand-side covariates. Weibull models permit monotonic duration dependence 
of a positive (i.e., the hazard rate increases over time), negative (the hazard rate decreases over time), or constant (the hazard rate 
is time invariant) form. In the regressions in table 10, the coefficient on the Weibull function is estimated to be significantly greater 
than one, which indicates that the impact of the covariate on the hazard increases over time.
37  For example, many commentators emphasize the role of worsening income or wealth distribution or perceptions of relative 
deprivation on political motivation (e.g., Gurr 1970). However, historical, cross-country comparable, income distribution data are not Page 13
As a starting point, the variables employed in the previous section to predict the level of 
democracy were used to model its advent. Appended to this list were other variables such as prior history 
of liberalizing transitions, population density, the growth rate of urbanization, country size, international 
trade openness, dependency on trade taxes, and inflation, which in previous studies had been found to be 
statistically associated with the likelihood of political regime change. 
In table 10, six of these models are reported. The estimated coefficients have been transformed 
into the form of an accelerated failure time model, so that the coefficients represent the impact on the 
expected waiting time for a liberalizing breakthrough. The results indicate that the cumulative number 
of a country’s prior liberalizing transitions, the world level of democracy, and the growth rate of GDP 
per capita are robustly correlated with the likelihood of a democratic transition; literacy is also positively 
correlated, though less robustly. The first two variables could be thought of as environmental or 
trend variables: The more a country has liberalized in the past, the less likely it is to experience further 
liberalization as it encounters a kind of democratic asymptote, while the greater the worldwide level of 
the democracy, the greater encouragement of, and shorter waiting time for a liberalizing breakthrough in 
any particular country.
The other three variables relate more directly to country performance or characteristics. 
Conditional on the other variables, the more rapid the growth of per capita income growth, the 
longer the waiting time for transition—i.e., in the short-run economic performance buys a certain 
degree of popular acquiescence, though in the long-run rising incomes auger against authoritarian 
rule.38 Surprisingly, the degree of international trade openness is also associated with longer waiting 
times for liberalizing breakthroughs, though some might point to the history of East Asia, where 
countries democratized at relatively high levels of per capita income after adopting an outward-oriented 
development model. Conversely, conditional on the other variables, the higher the rate of literacy, the 
shorter the waiting time for a democratic transition. It would be erroneous to conclude from these results 
that as a policy matter one should oppose economic growth or support closure to trade as a means of 
encouraging democratization. Both are desirable in and of themselves, and, in the long run, prosperity 
contributes to expectations of political liberalization. However, in the short run, these forces may act as a 
kind of safety valve for discontent. Status as a fuel exporter also contributes to longer waiting times, but 
this result is not robust to the inclusion of any of the other additional regressors reported in table 10, 
though these additional regressions are not reported for the sake of brevity. 
widely available, and data on wealth distribution or subjective appraisals of relative deprivation even less so, and what research does 
exist on this fragmentary data does not yield robust conclusions. See Perotti (1996) and Przeworski et al. (2000) and sources cited 
therein.
38  Obversely, economic crises can be destabilizing for authoritarian regimes a la Haggard and Kaufman (1995). This effect could be 
particularly salient for the oil exporters, which experience substantial volatility in income growth associated with swings in the price 
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As an illustration, the expected likelihood of a liberalizing transition for eight large Arab 
countries derived from regression 10.1 is plotted in figure 3. Several things can be observed. First, the 
likelihood of a liberalizing transition in these countries was quite low at the beginning of the sample 
period and generally increased about 5 percent in any given year for the group as a whole. However, this 
increase has not been monotonic. For several countries there was a noticeable spike in the probability 
of a liberalizing breakthrough in 1989 or 1990, which was during a worldwide democracy wave, a period 
in which Algeria and Jordan experienced liberalizing regime changes according to the Polity IV scoring. 
The spike for Morocco came later, primarily a product of world conditions together with poor economic 
performance in Morocco during the early 1990s. In both cases the likelihood of a breakthrough in a 
particular year peaked at more than 20 percent, a substantial likelihood, though well under a 50 percent 
probability. Morocco, which did not experience transition, adhered to the prediction of the model, 
whereas in some sense Jordan beat the odds.
In regression 10.2, in which the share of trade taxes in government revenue is added to the core 
specification, the imposition of trade taxes is associated with a shorter waiting time until a democratic 
transition. In some previous research, trade taxes have been shown to be associated with political 
instability—imposing trade taxes and delinking from the world economy encourages lawlessness in forms 
such as smuggling and underinvoicing, and contributes to the de-legitimization of the political regime. 
(Though it could be argued that causality runs in the other direction: Weak regimes rely on trade taxes 
because they are relatively easy to collect.) 
Some commentators have argued that Islam may confer additional legitimacy to Arab political 
regimes despite their questionable ability to deliver material progress or political liberty.40 In regression 
10.3, the religious affiliation shares are added to the core regression specification. The Catholic 
population share is associated with shorter times to democratic transitions, though this result is not 
robust to the inclusion of trade taxes or other regressors to the specification (not reported). Neither the 
Muslim population share (regression 10.3) nor Muslim majority status (regression 10.4) appear to affect 
transition waiting times. Contemporary Muslims do not appear to be particularly quiescent.
However, in regression 10.5, paralleling the previously obtained results, the Arab population 
share is associated with significantly longer waiting times for liberalizing transitions. Again, one can 
think of multiple interpretations of this statistical result: that it reflects some essential characteristic of 
Arab culture or that the Arab population share variable is acting as a proxy for omitted variables, such as 
expenditure on internal security forces or uniquely undemocratic elite attitudes. This result is reproduced 
in regression 10.6 where trade taxes are added to the specification.
  For a number of the Arab countries the time-series data is fragmentary, and while these countries were included in the underly-
ing regression sample, the time-series graphs for these countries are not particularly illuminating.
40  This argument is sometimes couched in terms of an Islamic juridic tradition of quietism, though in fairness, scholars who have 
documented these cultural antecedents (e.g., Lewis 1993, Crone 2004) have done so in the context of 11th century jurisprudence, 
not contemporary political culture, and have acknowledged the existence of activist traditions as well. Others have been less 
circumspect (e.g., Huntington 1984).Page 15
But the Arab population share changes only slowly—in this application it amounts essentially 
to a fixed effect that reduces the probability of liberalization but does not have much of an impact on 
changes in its likelihood from year to year. (The same could be said for the religious affiliation variables.) 
This point is illustrated in figure 4 for Egypt, the largest Arab country. Figure 4 plots the likelihood 
of a democratizing regime change derived from each of the six models reported in table 10. The plot 
associated with regressions 10.5 and 10.6 lie below the others while exhibiting the same pattern of year-
to-year variation. In this sense the difference of the two interpretations of the Arab population share 
variable is potentially important. If it is the case that Arabs are unusually quiescent, then the plots of 
regressions 10.5 and 10.6 may provide a credible indication of the level and evolution of the likelihood 
of a liberalizing breakthrough. However, if the Arab population share is really a proxy for some 
unobservable, especially one that may exhibit more temporal variation than the Arab ethnic population 
share, then these plots may be a misleading indicator of the changes in the hazard rates. 
CONCLUSIONS
This paper has used a series of statistical models to examine the determinants of democracy and 
liberalizing regime changes with a focus on the countries of the Middle East and North Africa region. 
The models suggest that the Arab world’s ongoing democratic deficit is comprehensible in terms of 
underlying structural factors: The most important determinants of democracy are a British colonial 
history, lack of modernization, the democratic status of neighboring countries, taxes as a share of 
government revenue, ethnic homogeneity, and the Arab ethnic population share. In a considerably 
truncated sample, some cultural attributes are also significant, and the male-female sex ratio was often 
statistically significant, though other proxies for the status of women were not. 
The region is self-evidently underendowed with respect to the first three attributes and arguably 
the fourth, but it is the interpretation of the Arab ethnic population share that is problematic. It could 
point to some essential antidemocratic aspect of Arab culture, though the small existing body of survey 
evidence does not appear to bear this out, or it could be that in the statistical analysis the Arab population 
share is simply a proxy for some unobservable, such as investment in institutions of internal repression 
that may not be culturally determined but rather reflects the preferences of the governing elite. It could 
also be the case that while the statistical result is correct—holding the other regressors constant, the 
Arab ethnic share is negatively correlated with democracy—this is simply capturing a particular historical 
moment in the Middle East and that in the long run, “Arab-ness” will lose its explanatory power.
It is also worth noting hypotheses that did not receive robust support in this analysis, namely 
that the region’s lack of democracy is related to the presence of oil rents, conflict with Israel or other 
neighbors, or Islam. The last result, that the Muslim population share is not a robust explanator of 
democratic status, parallels the finding of Noland (2005) that Islamic religious affiliation is unrelated to 
economic performance.Page 1
With respect to the likelihood of liberalizing political transitions, the models indicate that 
the odds on these occurring in any given year are generally low but rising, as relatively poor economic 
performance combined with increasing levels of education erode popular acquiescence to authoritarian 
governance. In this respect, the distinction between the interpretation of the Arab ethnic share as an 
intrinsic cultural marker and as a proxy for some unobservable  factor is important—if the former is 
correct, then one would expect the likelihood of regime change to rise only gradually over time, whereas 
if it is the latter, the probabilities may exhibit much greater temporal variability. Yet another possibility is 
that these results are driven by the relatively common occurrence of governments based at least partly on 
narrow subethnic or tribal allegiances, which could generate complex transitional paths. 
The results reported in this paper suggest that regimes throughout the region are likely to 
come under increasing pressure over time as increasing education and prosperity generate populations 
increasingly dissatisfied with authoritarian rule, though there is an implicit tension between the long and 
short run: Higher levels of development are associated with democracy, but in the short run, growth 
may limit pressures for political change. It is also the case that developments both within the region and 
elsewhere—in Eastern Europe and Central Asia, for example—may contribute to demonstration effects 
or waves. That said, specific democratizing episodes in Iraq, Lebanon, and Palestine during 2005—
collectively labeled “the Arab Spring”—each have strongly idiosyncratic elements. Nevertheless, the 
advent of pan-Arab media such as the television stations al-Jazeera and al-Arabiya, may be contributing 
to a more genuinely pan-Arab cultural space in which developments in one country have a more 
immediate and profound influence on outcomes elsewhere within the region. Page 1
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Average years per country  22.4  26.3  27.30  23.4  22.3  26.50 
R2  (overall)  0.47 0.43 0.48 0.42 0.45 0.43 
R2  (within)  0.29 0.31 0.35 0.32 0.31 0.31 
R2  (between)  0.53 0.43 0.55 0.48 0.45 0.41 
   




3.1 3.2 3.3 3.4 3.5
Variable
Polity 2 score at 
t+1
Polity 2 score 
at t+1
Polity 2 score at 
t+1
Polity 2 score at 
t+1
Polity 2 score at 
t+1






























General conflict dummy -0.55 -0.53
(-1.83)c (-1.78)
c
Israel conflict dummy -1.66 -1.61
(-1.63) (-1.58)







Observations 948 887 2326 2326 2326
N u m b e r  o f  c o u n t r i e s 8 48 58 58 58 5
Smallest years per country 1 1 1 1 1
Average years per country 11.3 10.4 27.4 27.4 27.4
R
2 (overall) 0.39 0.37 0.42 0.44 0.44
R
2 (within) 0.14 0.09 0.35 0.35 0.35
R
2 (between) 0.38 0.35 0.42 0.44 0.44
Note: 
a indicates significance at the 1 percent level; 
b at 5 percent; 










Polity 2 score at 
t+1
Polity 2 score at 
t+1
Polity 2 score at 
t+1





Ethno-linguistic fractionalization -3.35 -2.96 -0.18
(-1.57) (-2.01)b (-0.09)






















Constant -1.32 10.88 1.66
(-0.53) (2.87)a (0.56)
Observations 1,084 1,637 1,005
Number of countries 37 60 34
Smallest years per country 15 1 15
Average years per country 29.3 27.3 29.6
R
2 (overall) 0.43 0.49 0.50
R
2 (within) 0.43 0.27 0.35
R
2 (between) 0.42 0.54 0.55
Note: 
a indicates significance at the 1 percent level; 
b at 5 percent; 
c at 10 percent. 
Table 4Table 5 
  5.6 5.7  5.8 5.9  5.1  5.2  5.3 5.4  5.5 
Variable 
Polity 2 score 
at t+1 
Polity 2 score 
 at t+1 
Polity 2 score 
 at t+1 
Polity 2 score  
at t+1 
Modernization  1.31 1.29  1.32 1.33 
Polity 2 score 
 at t+1  Polity 2 score at t+1
Polity 2 score 
 at t+1 
Polity 2 score  
at t+1 
Polity 2 score 
 at t+1 






Ethno-linguistic   

















Hindu  share       
 (3.      
Buddhist  share       
 (2.      
Jewish  share       
 (2.      
Catholic  share       
       
Orthodox  sha      
       
Protestant  sha      
 (2.      
Muslim  share  0.00  -0.04   0.00 
 (-0. (0.00)  (-2.59)
a  (0.22) 
Muslim  majori      
        
Muslim share  
   (distance - wei        
        
Arab share  -0.10    -0.09  -0.09 




Fuel  exporter  -3.13  -1.86  -1.90 
























0.13         
04)
a        
0.09         
09)
b        
0.11         
18)
b        
0.03         
(1.09)         
re  0.03         
(0.82)         
re  0.06         
22)
b        
-0.02  -0.06     
62)  (-4.34)
a     
ty     -4.74     
  (-4.15)
a    
ghted)        -60.06   
    (-5.05)
a  
        -0.10 
      (-5.79)
a
         
         
              (table continues next page)    
 
Table 5 
               
(continued)                 
                 
                  5.1 5.2  5.3 5.4 5.5 5.6 5.7 5.8 5.9
Variable 
Polity 2 score 
 at t+1  Polity 2 score at t+1
Polity 2 score 
 at t+1 
Polity 2 score 
 at t+1 
Polity 2 Score 
at t+1 
Polity 2 score 
 at t+1 
Polity 2 score 
 at t+1 
Polity 2 score  
at t+1 
Polity 2 score 
 at t+1 
Constant                    1.43 5.15 4.89 5.17 5.38 5.39 5.22 5.42 5.41
       
Observations                   
                   
Smallest years per country 
    country                   
2  (overall)                   
    0. 5  0. 5 0 5  0. 5  0. 5 0 5  0. 5 0 5 
2  (between)    0. 5  0. 4 0 7  0. 9  0. 9 0 8  0. 1 0 1 




a (7.20)a (7.11)a (6.88)a (7.31)
a (7.19)
a
2,324 2,326 2,326 2,326 2,326 2,326 2,322 2,322 2,322
Number  of  countries 83 85 85 85 85 85 85 85 85
1  1  1  1  1  1  1  1  1 
Average  years per 28 27.4 27.4 27.4 27.4 27.4 27.3 27.3 27.3
R 0.55 0.49 0.49 0.49 0.52 0.52 0.50 0.52 0.52
R
2  (within) 0.35 3 3 .3 3 3 .3 3 .3
R 0.63 5 5 .5 5 5 .5 6 .6
 
Note: 
a indicates significance at the 1 per el; 
b at 5 percent; 
c   10 percent.  
 











Polity 2 score at 
t+1
Polity 2 score at 
t+1
Polity 2 score 
at t+1
























Muslim re 0.00 0.01 0.00
(0.13) (0.55) (0.19)





Fuel ex -1.56 -1.61 -2.02
(-1.00) (-1.19) (-1.47)
Female share of labor force -0.02
(-0.70)





Observ ns 2197 2322 2322
Constant 75 85 85
Smalles ears per country 14 1 1
Averag ntry 29.3 27.3 27.3
R
2 (o 0.53 0.52 0.53
R
2 (withi 0.33 0.35 0.35
R
2 (between) 0.63 0.61
Note: 

























b at 5 percent; 
c at 10 percent. 
Table 67.1 7.2 7.3 7.4
iable
Polity 2 score at 
t+1
Polity 2 score at 
t+1


















































 r at i o






ervations 1839 1835 718 1839
b e r  o f  c o u n t r i e s 8 28 27 68 28
a l l e s t  y e a r s  p e r  c o u n t r y 11111
rage years per country 22.4 22.4 9.4 22.4
overall) 0.57 0.57 0.55 0.57
within) 0.30 0.30 0.07 0.30
between) 0.66 0.66 0.64 0.66
e: 
a indicates significance at the 1 percent level; 
b at 5 percent; 
c at 10 percent. 
7.5 7.6 7.7
Var
e at  Polity 2 score at 
t+1
Polity 2 score at 
t+1
Polity 2 score at 
t+1


















































Obs 1839 1839 1839
N u m 28 28 2
S m 11
Ave 22.4 22.4 22.4
R
2 ( 0.57 0.57 0.58
R
2 ( 0.30 0.30 0.29
R
2 ( 0.66 0.66 0.68
Not










Neighborhood Polity score 2.0
World Polity score 0.5
Arab share (in percent) -1.9
British colonial dummy* 3.7
Tax revenue (share of current government  revenue, in percent) 0.8
Sex rat io -0.5
change in the explanatory variables 
Note: R eported value for the British colonial dummy is the change in the polity score corresponding 
to a change in the dummy rather than a one standard deviation change.
Actual Predicted Actual-predicted
Algeria -3 -2.4 -0.6
Bahrain
b -9 -7.1 -1.9
Egypt
a -3 -2.7 -0.3
Jordan -2 -4.0 2.0
Kuwait -7 -8.3 1.3
Morocco -6 -3.9 -2.1
Oman
b -9 n.a. n.a.
Qatar -10 -8.2 -0.8
Saudi Arabia -10 n.a. n.a.
Syria -7 -5.8 -1.2
Tunisia -3 -2.4 -0.6
Yemen -2 -2.5 0.5
a. Data for 1998.   b. Data for 1997.
 
Table 9   Actual versus predicted Polity score, 2000
Note: Fitted values generated from regression  7.7.  Prediction for S audi Arabia and 
Qatarnot available (n.a.) due to missing data on tax revenue.


















































egime changes 72.00 54.00 72.00 72.00 72.00 54.00
 (shape parameter) 1.50 1.60 1.57 1.49 1.53 1.67
o (constant duration dependence) 0 0 0 0 0 0
ote: 
a indicates significance at the 1 percent level; 
b at 5 percent; 
c at 10 percent. 
Table 10
10.1 10.2 10.3 10.4 10.5
iable
Polity 2 score 
at t+1
Polity 2 score 
at t+1
Polity 2 score 
at t+1

















racy rate -0.01 -0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00
(1.76)
c (2.22)


































ervations 1292 911 1294 1295 1295






    
 
 
Table A.1 Countries in the regression samples 
 
Algeriaa     Egypta     Kuwaita     Romania
Argentinaa,b     El Salvadora   Luxembourg   Saudi Arabiaa 
Australiaa,b   Finlanda,b   Madagascar   Singaporea 
Austriaa,b  Francea,b   Malaysiaa   South Africaa,b  
Bahraina   Gabon     Mali    Spaina,b 
Belgiuma,b   Ghanaa     Mexicoa,b  Sri Lanka
Benin     Greecea,b  Moroccoa,b   Swedena,b 
Bolivia     Guatemalaa   Nepal    Switzerlanda,b 
Brazila,b     Guinea     Netherlandsa,b   Syriaa,b 
Bulgariab  Haiti     New Zealanda,b   Taiwan, Chinaa 
Burkina Faso   Hungaryb   Nicaragua   Thailanda 
Burundi     Iceland     Nigeria    Togo
Cameroon   Indiaa,b     Norwaya,b   Tunisiaa,b 
Canadaa,b   Indonesiaa   Omana    Turkeya,b 
Chilea,b     Iran.a,b     Pakistana,b   United Kingdoma,b 
Chinaa     Irelanda,b  Panamaa  United Statesa,b
Colombiaa   Israela,b     Paraguay   Uruguaya,b
Costa Ricaa   Italya,b     Perua     Venezuelaa
Cote d’Ivoire   Jamaicaa  Philippinesa   Yemena
Cyprus     Japana,b   Polandb  
Demarka,b   Jordana     Portugala,b  
Dominican Republic  Korea.a     Qatara  
 
Note: All countries are in the 85-country sample. a indicates the countries belonging to the subsample used in 
regression 4.1; b indicates the countries belonging to the subsample used in regression 4.2. 
 
 
 
 
 
 